Here's a wire-change email with 8 warning signs planted in it. It's synthetic: every name and number in it is fictional. I use it to test how an AI review copes with wire fraud in private funds, where one changed account number can send an LP's capital to a stranger.
The FundAdmin Skills review found 6 of the 8. It also put the payment on hold, which is the part I care about most. The 2 I'd score as missed are the ones your own process has to catch.
What the email asks for
The email goes to an LP's wire operations team from "Operations" at kirrowyn.example. It claims to come from Kirrowyn Macro Partners, Ltd. and it's dated 11 April 2026. The subject line opens with "URGENT" and says the change is "Effective Immediately".
The story is a treasury restructuring. The fund is moving its receiving account from its U.S. bank to "its offshore treasury account in Grand Cayman", and wires to the old account "will be returned". The new details sit in a tidy table: Falgrove Bank (Cayman) Limited, an account ending 0039, a SWIFT code and a reference.
Then come the lines that should stop you:
- "You must update your records before Friday's scheduled distribution payment."
- "Please destroy any prior wire instructions you have on file and replace them with the above."
- "Do not reply to this email."
- "Please call us at the number below with any questions." No number follows.
It's signed "Operations Team", with Kirrowyn Macro Management LLC underneath. There's no person's name on it, and no job title.
The formatting's clean and the tone's polite, which is exactly why it makes a good test.
The 8 warning signs, and the 6 it found
The public samples README lists the 8 signs planted in this email. The worked example on the homepage says the review found 6, but not which 6. So I went through the report line by line against the list. The split below is my reading.
FundAdmin AI · Field notes
8 planted warning signs, scored against the review
The review found 6 and held the payment. The site doesn't say which 6, so this split is my reading of the report.
Found: 6
- Lookalike reply domainReply-To uses k1rrowyn.example, a "1" where the sender's domain has an "i". Flagged High Risk.
- Urgency pressure"URGENT", "Effective Immediately", "You must update your records" and a Friday deadline. Urgency rated High.
- Offshore bank changeAccount moved to a Grand Cayman bank, by email only. Flagged High Risk, payment on HOLD.
- No callback number"Call us at the number below", and no number below.
- Do not replyFlagged with the missing number: normal verification routes are blocked.
- No change authorisationNo signed notice, plus an order to destroy prior instructions. Both flagged.
Missed: 2
- Anonymous senderSigned "Operations Team". The report quotes the signature and never flags that no named officer signed.
- No confirmation code or dual signatureThe report prescribes a callback and a second approver. It never flags that the email carries neither a code nor a second signature.
The verdict sits at the top of the report: status BLOCKED, and "HIGH RISK: suspected wire-redirection (BEC) pattern". Its first action item is to hold: no update to payee records, and no wire to the new account.
The lookalike domain. The Reply-To and Message-ID domains are both k1rrowyn.example. The report calls it a one-character lookalike of the From domain and says to use no contact in the email.
The offshore move. The account moves to a bank in Grand Cayman (account ****0039), by unauthenticated email and "effective immediately". Flagged High Risk.
The blocked routes. The report puts "call us at the number below" and "Do not reply" together. With both in place, the usual ways to check are closed, so it says to use only contacts from your own system of record.
The urgency. It rates urgency High and lists the pressure phrases. Then it sets its own clock: run your internal verification timeline, and ignore the sender's.
The missing authorisation. There's no signed notice, and the email asks you to "destroy any prior wire instructions". The report treats that line as an embedded instruction and declines to follow it. It tells you to keep every prior record, for a good reason: destroying them "removes the trusted baseline for detecting the change".
It also raised 4 things the planted list doesn't include:
- The deadline is a "distribution payment", which the report notes normally runs from fund to LP, while the email is about LP-to-fund inflows.
- The account name, Kirrowyn Macro Partners Ltd, drops the comma and full stop from the fund's name. The signatory is another entity again, Kirrowyn Macro Management LLC.
- 11 April 2026 was a Saturday.
- No amount or currency appears anywhere.
And it said what it couldn't check. The email came in as a transcript, so the SPF, DKIM, DMARC and Return-Path checks are NOT PERFORMED. With no allowlist of known domains supplied, the sender check is UNKNOWN.
The 2 it missed, and what catches them
The anonymous sender. The email is signed "Operations Team", with no officer's name or title. The report read that signature: it quotes it in the email summary and uses the LLC's name in its entity-name flag. It never says that no named person signed a request to move money.
A GP that asks you to move money without putting a name to the request has told you something. I want that written down in the review, where the next person will see it.
No confirmation code or dual signature. The email carries no confirmation code and no second signature. The report's actions cover the right controls: an outbound callback to a pre-established number, and a second approver. The finding itself is absent. Nowhere does it say this email lacks a code or a dual signature.
You could score this one either way, since the control is right there in the action items. I'd count it as a miss. Someone who reads only the risk flags won't learn what the email left out.
So the anonymous sender is a clear miss, and the second is a judgement call about how strictly you score. Both are absences: something a genuine request might carry, and this one doesn't. I think absences are harder to spot than something present and wrong, for people as well as models.
Which is where your own process comes in. The report's next steps are worth copying into it:
- Hold all changes. Don't update payee records or pay the new account.
- Call back on a pre-established number from your own records, never one given in the email, with a second approver.
- Escalate it as a suspected BEC attempt to information security, and keep the original message with full headers.
- Keep the current and prior wire instructions.
Two questions for your team. Does your callback list come from records that predate every email you've received? And what happens today when a change request arrives with no named signatory?
In my post on the moats that hold for fund administrators, I argued that every finding should link back to its source. This report's flags do, which is how I could score them. Add these 2 signs to your own checklist and your team covers what this review missed.
Questions about wire-change emails
What is wire-change fraud?
An email asks you to send money to new bank details. This one came with a lookalike reply address and a Friday deadline. The FundAdmin Skills report calls it a wire-redirection or business email compromise (BEC) pattern.
How do you verify a change to wire instructions?
Hold the change and keep the prior instructions as your baseline. Then call back on a number from your own system of record that predates the email, never one the email gives you, with a second approver.
Can AI spot a fraudulent wire-change email?
It can flag warning signs and hold the payment. In this synthetic example it found 6 of 8 planted signs, and the report's status was BLOCKED. A person still makes the call-back and decides.
Does FundAdmin Skills approve or release payments?
It drafts first-pass reviews for a qualified person to check, and it never approves or moves money.
See the full review
The wire-change worked example has the synthetic email and the full 8-page review report, so you can check my scoring against the source.
FundAdmin Skills is free and MIT-licensed. It drafts first-pass reviews like this one for a qualified person to check, and it never approves or moves money. Claude Code is the supported route; the other hosts are experimental. Start at fundadmin.dev.